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The euro and capital markets: A new era
1 







In its publication “One market, one money” the European Commission presented its 
assessment of the likely economic gains to be obtained from the adoption of the single 
currency (European Commission 1990). Three broad classes of benefits were expected to 
result from EMU. Firstly, the disappearance of exchange rate variability and reduction of 
transaction costs in intra-European cross-border transactions should increase micro-economic 
efficiency. Secondly, the more stable macroeconomic environment and the focus on fiscal 
rectitude and price stability should lead to a growth-oriented macroeconomic environment. 
Finally, the creation of a large homogeneous financial zone should make the euro zone more 
resilient to external shocks and lead to a currency that could challenge the worldwide status 
of the US dollar. 
 
Many observers assess the financial success of EMU with respect to the external value of the 
euro. The weakening of the euro against the main international currencies since January 1999 
has been taken as a sign of poor performance. While such a yardstick has the attraction of 
easy monitoring, it is nevertheless a meaningless reference point. No one would want to base 
a judgement on whether the United States is well served by having the dollar on short-term 
gyrations of that currency in the foreign exchange market. Whether the euro is a success or 
not should be based on meaningful economic indicators capturing the essential features of 
EMU. Has the euro maintained a stable internal value (i.e. low inflation)? Has it led to higher 
economic efficiency in the EU? Has it sheltered the EU economy from external turbulences? 
While the performance of a monetary arrangement cannot be assessed in confidence from 
experience over a period of just two to three years, it should be noted that, despite a large 
series of economic shocks in the world economy in the second half of the 1990s, external 
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financial turbulences have not reverberated inside the European Union. This is in sharp 
contrast with the early 1970s when the monetary unification project mapped in the Werner 
report was put off track by the oil crisis of 1973. 
 
Even if it is obvious that the introduction of the euro represents a fundamental change in the 
monetary organisation of the European Union, it is nevertheless extraordinary that the 
original analysis of the European Commission completely disregarded the potential 
efficiency gains in the European financial organisation that would result from EMU. In 
recent years, however, the European Union has come to realise that the success of EMU also 
depends on the development of a better financial architecture. Initiatives to develop the 
venture capital industry, catering to the needs of innovative and fast growing firms, or to 
improve the functioning of the government bond market (European Commission, 2000) are 
representatives of such a shift in attitude. 
 
The continental European financial architecture has traditionally been organised around 
banks. In the last two decades, traditional banking intermediation from deposits to loans has 
weakened, whilst capital markets have gained in importance. This is sometimes described as 
the “Americanisation of finance” (Steinherr, 1998) even if in the European context this has, 
so far, been essentially achieved through the transformation of the activities performed by 
banks and not via the emergence of a set of new and different financial intermediaries. While 
there is a wide body of literature looking at the pros and cons of bank-based vs. market-based 
finance, it not clear than one polar system necessarily dominates. For example, Davis (2001) 
supports the view that, as the services provided by banks and the capital market are imperfect 
substitutes, financial systems where banks and the capital market exist alongside provide a 
better shock absorption capacity to the economy. 
 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 examines the forces that have changed the 
financial landscape at the world level over the last two decades. Section 3 summarises the 
arguments of how the introduction of the euro should add to these broader economic forces 
in reshaping euro financial markets. Section 4 verifies whether the actual experience since 
January 1999 has been in line with the ex ante expectations. Most of the analysis will be 
based on developments of the bond market.
4 Section 5 offers some conclusions. 
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2.  The changing worldwide financial landscape 
 
EMU was expected to lead to deep changes in the way finance is organised in Europe. 
However, finance has undergone profound changes in the last two decades and there is no 
clear sign that the process of change has come to an end. Therefore, to avoid attributing to 
the euro some changes resulting from broader forces, it is useful to see how the world 
environment for finance has changed in the last two decades or so. Naturally, EMU in most 
cases would amplify or/and accelerate these forces. 
 
The driving forces for the evolution of finance over the last two decades can be grouped into 
seven broad classes: technology, advances in finance theory, retrenchment of the state in the 
provision of finance, free capital flows, introduction of worldwide financial standards, 
institutionalisation of management of savings and demographic changes. (see for example 
BIS 2001) 
 
Without the rapid and continuous advances in information and telecommunication 
technology, finance, as we know it currently would have been impossible. Massive increases 
in computing power and faster data transmission enabled the application of new financial 
theory, facilitated profound advances in risk management and the unbundling of financial 
risks. 
 
The wholesale dismantling of restrictions to capital flows as well as a lower involvement of 
public authorities in the provision of financial services, although at different speed across 
countries, have made the finance industry much more responsive to market forces. This has 
been accompanied by the introduction of worldwide standards in most fields of finance (the 
Basle capital agreement for banks is just one example). 
 
In most developed countries, there has been a tremendous shift toward institutionalised 
management of savings. An ever-growing share of financial assets is nowadays controlled by 
professional asset managers, irrespective of whether they operate within banking 
conglomerates or outside of banks. This process has certainly not run its full course as the 
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prospective ageing of population in most developed countries, by putting pay-as-you-go 
pension systems under strain, will reinforce the importance of professional asset managers. 
 
The overall consequence of these forces is that the relative weight of capital market activities 
has increased tremendously compared to traditional banking intermediation. 
 
3.  How and why EMU changes the world of finance in Europe 
 
The evolution of finance is essentially the consequence of the interplay of economic forces 
among economic agents in need of raising funds, savers, regulation and available technology. 
There is no reason to suspect that regulation and technology would be crucially dependent on 
EMU. So let us consider how the economic landscape prompted by EMU should change the 
behaviour of investors. At the end of the day, borrowers and the infrastructure will have to 
adjust so as to satisfy the needs of investors. 
 
Firstly, the monetary philosophy underpinning EMU is that aggregate price stability is a 
useful goal and that inflation cannot enhance economic growth and efficiency in the medium 
term. Stable and low inflation should reduce the economic risk, driving down risk premia, 
and ultimately enabling investors to adopt longer time horizons for their investment. This 
should lead to the development of an “equity-based” culture. 
 
Secondly, the adoption of the single currency in most of the European Union eliminates 
currency risk in cross border investment decision. As noted by Brookes (1999) performance 
of cross border investments prior to the euro was mainly driven by country specific factors. 
In a nutshell about three quarters of the performance of cross border investment was 
ultimately related to exchange fluctuations and domestic monetary policy. As the exchange 
rate factor disappears with EMU and monetary policy is conducted for the whole euro-zone, 
past investment strategies break down. For example, Brookes shows that the potential excess 
performance, for a given level of risk, that can be obtained by relying on past cross border 
asset allocation rules shrinks by about three-quarters with the introduction of the euro. In 
other words, asset managers and investors will have to adopt a different investment strategy. 
For example, equity investment will shift away from country factors in favour of sectoral 
allocations and bond investments should be expected to be attracted to more credit risk 
(emergence of a corporate bond market) and more arbitrage along the yield curve.   6
 
Thirdly, the replacement of national currencies by the euro should lead to the disappearance 
of a regulatory driven “home bias” imposed on many institutional investors, facing strict 
limits on the extent of currency mismatches that they are allowed to bear. For example, in 
many European countries, life-insurance companies (one of the largest investors’ group) are 
prevented from running currency risk. Hence they are forced to invest their reserves in the 
currency in which their liabilities are denominated. This led to two consequences: financial 
markets were segmented along national currency lines and, as the size of most national 
markets is small, liquidity was rather poor. The disappearance of national currencies and 
their replacement by the euro removed overnight market fragmentation and widened 
considerably the set of investable securities. This should lead to the convergence of returns 
(for a given risk) across the zone, much higher levels of liquidity and much bigger cross 
border investment flows. 
 
The fragmentation along national currency lines, differences in monetary policies and 
exchange rate risk had wide-ranging consequences. Firstly, credit risk analysis and equity 
markets were under-developed. Secondly, the bond market in nearly all EU country was 
dominated, if not fully controlled by the government securities and public sector institutions. 
Thirdly, the only segment of the bond market controlled by the private sector was made of 
securities issued by the financial industry. 
 
4.  How financial markets have changed with EMU. 
 
Let us now check whether the changes expected from the introduction of the euro are already 
visible less than three years after the introduction of the single currency. 
 
The government bond market has traditionally been the dominant segment of the bond 
market. The removal of the “captive investors’ base” that most governments enjoyed prior to 
EMU has made place for a much more competitive environment. National treasuries have 
had no choice but to improve the attractiveness of their securities. Table 1 shows how the 
sizes of 10-year benchmark government bonds issued by the three largest countries of the 
euro-zone have changed in the period 1996-2001. These three countries have the largest 
funding needs. The issue size of government bonds in 1996 is fairly representative of the   7
situation before national treasuries changed the financing approach in the run-up to EMU. 
With the notable exception of France that had already taken steps to modernise its debt 
management policies, the size of the largest government benchmarks in both Italy and 
Germany was about EUR 10bn and the trading activity in these bonds was relatively low. As 
the euro became a distinct prospect, both Germany and Italy increased substantially the size 
of individual bond issues so as to provide investors with adequate liquidity. Nowadays, 
benchmark government bonds of the three largest euro-zone countries range between EUR 
20 and 25bn. For the sake of comparison, US benchmark Treasury bonds, before the cut in 
individual issues prompted by the budget surplus, had an individual size of about USD 15bn. 
 
Table 1: Size of benchmark government bonds (in billion euro) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Germany 12.8 15.3 15.0 20.0 20.0 24.0
France 18.7 21.8 25.3 24.0 18.0 19.7
Italy 8.7 14.7 22.8 23.0 21.1 18.7  
Note: Largest outstanding 10 year government in each year, 2001 to end September 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
National treasuries have taken additional steps to improve the attractiveness of their 
securities. They have harmonised the characteristics of their bonds (for example, adoption of 
similar coupon calculation conventions) and have become much more transparent in their 
issuing policies (pre-announcement of issue calendars, increase in outstanding securities by 
re-openings). 
 
Smaller European countries have lower refinancing requirements and it would be difficult for 
them to aim for the benchmark size of the largest ones. However, they have not remained 
inactive. They have taken steps to improve the liquidity of their securities. For example Spain 
has focused its borrowing programme on maturities where the largest countries are not very 
active. The Netherlands and Belgium have restructured their debt through buy-backs and 
exchange offers to reduce the number of government bonds and to consolidate them into 
larger issues. In both countries the target size of benchmark government bonds stands at 
around EUR 10bn, about twice as large as before. Several countries (Belgium, Austria and 
Portugal) have also aimed to reach a wider investors’ base by launching the original (large) 
tranches of new bond issue through syndication. This has allowed them to tap pools of funds   8
that otherwise would not have been available. Ireland provides one of the most striking 
examples of the efforts to improve the liquidity of its bonds. In 1999, The Irish National 
Treasury Management Agency exchanged nearly all the government bonds quoted on the 
stock exchange (which had features that restricted their marketability) for new benchmarks of 
3, 5, 10 and 16 years maturity. 
 
The question arises whether the gains obtained by some countries are not offset by the losses 
suffered by others. This is unlikely to be the case. Confronted with the forces of competition 
national treasuries have vastly improved the attractiveness of their securities. Together with 
the credit-enhancing feature of the Stability and Growth Pact that should prevent the 
unsustainable build-up of public debt, these adjustments have led to relatively small yield 
spreads between European sovereigns. In the 10-year segment of the bond market yield 
spreads of Euro-zone government bond with respect to Germany range from 10 to 35bp. 
 
There are essentially two ways open to bond investors looking to enhance return. The first is 
to move along the yield curve. The second is to take on more credit risk. The first approach 
has always been available within the EU, but the liquidity was not necessarily sufficient to 
make this strategy viable. The improvement in the government bond market renders this 
approach possible. The option of more credit risk was mostly absent. The EU bond market 
was essentially the preserve of the public sector and of high quality financial institutions. 
Since the introduction of the euro there has been a remarkable growth of the non-government 
bond market. Table 2 provides the structure of non-government outstanding bonds by main 
classes of borrowers. It should be noted that the absolute size of the non-government bond 
market in US dollars exceeds that of the euro. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of outstanding non-government bond markets (% of total) 
1995 2000  difference 1995 2000  difference
Corporations 28.5 24.8 -3.7 8.1 16.3 8.2
Financial institutions 18.9 20.8 1.9 56.3 49.2 -7.0
Collateralised debt 39.6 39.2 -0.3 19.5 26.1 6.5
Non govt. public sector 11.5 13.7 2.2 11.6 5.3 -6.3
Supranationals 1.6 1.5 -0.1 4.4 3.1 -1.3
USD EUR
 
Source: BIS 2001 
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As Table 2 clearly indicates, there has been no dramatic shift in the overall structure of the 
USD bond market between 1995 and 2000. By contrast the euro market has undergone 
significant changes. The share of the outstanding bonds of corporations has doubled to 16% 
in only five years, but it still trails that of the US dollar market. The share controlled by 
banks has been reduced to about 50%, while that controlled by collateralised debt (essentially 
German Pfandbriefe (mortgage backed securities) and securities structured in a similar way 
in other European countries) has increased. 
 
The evolution of outstanding stocks as depicted in Table 2 reacts at slow speed as the pattern 
of new flows changes. To better understand whether there are visible effects of EMU we turn 
to flow data. Ideally one would like to analyse the flow of borrowings and their main 
characteristics and compare the market in euro with an external benchmark (say the USD 
bond market). There are several alternative data sources on bond market activity (Capital 
Data Bondware, IFR, BIS, European Commission). However, the geographical coverage and 
the details available differ substantially. No data source dominates the others in all respects. 
We shall rely on the European Commission data to assess the structure by borrowers of bond 
issues in euro since January 1999. Subsequently we shall rely on IFR data to look at the main 
characteristics of individual transactions and for the comparison with the USD market.  
 
The data in Table 3 clearly indicate that there have been quite significant changes in the 
structure by borrowers in the euro capital market. Let us assume that if the euro had not come 
into being, the average structure of flows in the euro-zone bond market would have remained 
as given by the structure presented in Table 2.
5 Compared to such a scenario there have been 
dramatic shifts. The most important is that the corporate sector has massively increased its 
direct calls on the bond market. Compared with the 8% market share of non-government 
outstanding bonds in 1995, the corporate sector has captured about a fifth of the total 
issuance since the launch of the euro. A second feature is that the share of new bond issues 
originated by banks is substantially lower than in the past while the collateralised bond 
market has been growing sharply. Some of this growth is related to changes in banking 
activity. Instead of holding loans on their balance sheet and refinancing them through bond 
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issues, banks have embarked into securitising some of their loans. Finally, supranationals 
have reduced their calls on the euro bond market while regional and local authorities have 
started to tap the market. It should be observed that the structure by borrowers of new issues 
in euro is rather close to that of outstanding bonds in the USD. The notable difference is that 
in Europe banks play a larger role than in the US and the converse is true for collateralised 
bonds. This is not surprising as the participation of US banks in credit creation is much lower 
than in Europe, while that of other providers of credit outside the banking sector is much 
more developed in America. 
 
Table 3: Structure by borrowers of non-government bond issues in euro 
1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001
Local agencies and supranationals 70.5 70.5 57.9 9.0% 10.1% 10.3%
Collaterralised bonds 294.6 241.4 145.8 37.5% 34.6% 26.1%
Financials 280.5 249.3 197.4 35.7% 35.7% 35.3%
Corporates 140.3 136.5 158.4 17.9% 19.6% 28.3%
Total non government 785.9 697.7 559.6 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Amount issued (EUR bn) Share of total
 
Note: 2001 up to the end of August 
Source: European Commission 
 
While the evidence presented so far suggests that the euro bond market is converging to US 
standards, we now examine whether this also holds for the characteristics of individual bond 
issues. We rely on the IFR Platinum data and consider only international bonds. An obvious 
point for comparison is the size of bond issues. In the period January 1999 to August 2001, 
the median bond issue size in euro is EUR 200m and in dollar USD 200m.
6  Table 4 provides 
another picture of the size distribution of bond issues. There are relatively more issues in 
dollar in the smaller (less than USD 100m) and larger (more than USD 1bn) size brackets 
than in euro. In euro, there are relatively more middle-sized issues
7: issues in euro are more 
frequent in the intermediate segment ranging from 100m to 500m. 
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Table 4: Size distribution of new international bond issues in euro and USD. 
amounts no of issues amounts no of issues
 0-99m 2.94% 24.56% 2.47% 28.88%
 100-249m 12.60% 29.41% 6.98% 22.61%
 250-499m 19.61% 22.09% 12.04% 17.98%
 500-999m 24.96% 15.04% 19.67% 15.42%
 Above 1bn 39.89% 8.90% 58.84% 15.11%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
EUR issues USD issues
 
Source: Thomson Financial IFR, IFR Platinum CD-Rom 
 
Figure 1 provides a graphical description of the distribution by size of international bond 
issues in euro and in dollar. The Gini index for USD stands at 37% while that of the euro, at 
42%, indicates a slightly lower level of size inequality in euro. It should be observed that all 
the above statistics on size relate to the individual size of each transaction. It is not 
necessarily an accurate indicator of the outstanding amounts as they can be increased over 
time by issuing further tranches that, sharing all the characteristics of the original bond, are 
merged into a bigger issue. This is a technique that has been used by many of the frequent 
borrowers. In addition, several large borrowers have embarked onto more formalised 
programs of borrowings to make their securities more attractive to investors. 



















While we have seen that the corporate bond market has developed with EMU and that the 
size structure of euro denominated bonds has evolved toward the US level, it is also worth 
looking at the characteristics of the largest corporate deals. In both the United States and in   12
Europe, supranationals and public agencies (including Pfandbriefe) have long been the 
providers of the largest issues. Tables 5a and 5b provide the list of the ten largest 
international bond issues in dollar and euro, respectively. The publicly sponsored institutions 
in the United States, mortgage banks in Germany and several large financial institutions 
represent a large fraction of top-tier issuers. Table 5 only includes non-financial corporations 
and their financial subsidiaries as well as emerging market borrowers. The largest 
international bond issue over the last three years was done in euro by a subsidiary of Olivetti 
at the time it took over Telecom Italia. As the data in Table 5 clearly shows, the issue size of 
the largest individual corporate transactions in euro and dollar are fairly similar. On closer 
examination, however, two differences emerge: Firstly, the maturity range of the large 
corporate bond issues is much narrower in euro than in dollar. The longest maturity in euro 
stands at 7 years, while in dollar it goes to 40 years.
8 Secondly, the vast majority of the large 
corporate transactions in euro are made by the telecom sector. In the US, the telecom sector 
has also been a large borrower, but the sectoral diversity is clearly wider. 
 
Table 5a: Largest corporate international bonds since 1999 in USD. 
Maturity Date Launch Date Issue size Issuer/Borrower Company Name Maturity
7-Sep-01 9-Aug-00 6000 Unilever PLC 1
17-Aug-40 10-Aug-00 5157 Brazil, Republic of Brazil 40
28-Oct-09 20-Oct-99 5000 Ford Motor Credit Co 10
17-Nov-20 14-Nov-00 4657 Tyco International Ltd 20
15-May-31 8-May-01 4600 WorldCom Inc 30
16-Jul-04 8-Jul-99 4000 Ford Motor Credit Co 5
1-Aug-05 26-Jul-00 4000 Ford Motor Credit Co 5
15-May-11 8-May-01 4000 WorldCom Inc 10
1-Mar-11 7-Mar-01 3500 France Telecom SA 10
15-Jun-30 27-Jun-00 3500 Deutsche Telekom International Finance BV 30
Source: Thomson Financial IFR, IFR Platinum CD-Rom. Data exclude bonds of supranational, banks and financial 
institutions and cover the period January 1999 to August 2001. 
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Table 5b: Largest corporate international bonds since 1999 in EURO. 
Maturity Date Launch Date Issue size Issuer/Borrower Company Name Maturity
30-Jun-04 3-Jun-99 7944 Tecnost International NV 5
30-Jul-04 19-Jul-99 4500 Tecnost International NV 5
11-Jul-06 2-Jul-01 4500 Deutsche Telekom International Finance BV 5
12-Oct-01 29-Mar-00 4000 France Telecom SA 2
14-Feb-06 30-Jan-01 4000 General Motors Acceptance Corp 5
2-Feb-04 24-Jan-01 3500 Ford Motor Credit Co 3
14-Mar-04 7-Mar-01 3500 France Telecom SA 3
14-Mar-08 7-Mar-01 3500 France Telecom SA 7
14-Dec-00 19-May-99 3250 Repsol International Finance BV 2
1-Jan-05 14-Apr-99 3079 Vivendi Environment 6
Source: Thomson Financial IFR, IFR Platinum CD-Rom. Data exclude bonds of supranational, banks and financial 
institutions and cover the period January 1999 to August 2001. 
 
The above evidence suggests that the euro bond market has developed nicely and is coming 
close to sharing the main traits of the US international bond market. Further developments 
are likely for the following reasons. Firstly, venturing to the capital market requires time and 
the range of firms accessing the market will grow further over time. For example, in 
continental Europe about 500 firms are formally rated by the main rating agencies, while in 
the United States around 3,000 firms are rated (ECB, 2001b).
9 
 
One field in which the euro bond market has also recorded some success is in providing a 
source of funding for non-resident borrowers. The dollar has remained the currency of choice 
in international borrowings for most non-resident borrowers (outside the EU). However, 
several sovereigns from Latin America have raised funds in the euro bond market. The 
progress has been most spectacular with Eastern European sovereigns: most of these 
countries have an exchange rate policy that is linked to the euro, or at least their main 
economic ties are with the EU. Hence, borrowing in euro is seen as a sensible alternative. 
 
We have observed above that the number of firms having a formal rating is rather limited. 
While the abolition of national currencies has widened investment possibilities over a much 
bigger zone, information has not necessarily kept pace. Borrowings that were previously 
based on local information and name recognition are no longer a viable alternative in the 
euro market. Borrowers have to appeal to a wider set of investors, which tend to rely on 
external credit ratings. Since the introduction of the euro the number of bond issues without a 
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formal credit rating has trended downwards.  In addition, it should be stressed that acquiring 
or developing the credit risk analysis that is necessary in the new bond market requires time. 
 
One feature of the euro bond market has attracted a lot of attention. Contrary to other bond 
markets where the sovereign is also responsible for issuing the currency, in the euro-zone 
there is no natural issuer that would be the reference issuer. While the first role of 
government securities is to fund the public debt at a low cost, government securities also 
provide some externalities as they serve for the pricing of bonds issued by other borrowers 
and they can be used as hedging instruments. (BIS 2001)  In euro, there is no clear 
benchmark, although in the ten-year maturity and more recently in the five-year segment, 
German government bonds are the lowest yielding securities and the de facto benchmarks. 
 
The existence of a government benchmark as a pricing reference and as a hedging tool is 
important if the yield structure of the various classes of borrowers tends to be stable with 
respect to these reference bonds. This is especially the case for hedging. Table 6 presents the 
evolution of the correlation between the yield difference between a borrower and the German 
benchmark and the same difference between the swap rate and the same German benchmark. 
The results of the table are quite instructive. The yields of euro-land sovereigns are 
essentially driven by the yield on the German bund. For the rest of the market the swap rate 
is the most important reference point. It is thus not surprising that actual pricing and hedging 
in the euro bond market is based on the German (or French) government bonds for sovereign 
borrowers and other borrowers are priced off the swap rate.  This clearly shows that the 
absence of a unique incontestable government benchmark reference is not a real problem for 
the bond market. 













Note: Correlation between the yield difference between the issuer and the German bund and the yield difference between the 
swap rate and the German bund.  
Source: Bloomberg, authors’ calculations, Rated classes are made of a sample of securities from different borrowers.   15
 
The fact that the euro bond market is made of two segments that have, in some sense, a life 
of their own has a big impact on the development of the derivatives market. Hedging of a 
government bond position with interest rate swaps entails a significant tracking risk; the 
same holds for investors holding corporate bonds hedged with government securities or 
government bond based derivatives contracts.  Tables 7a and 7b depict the evolution of the 
size of the interest rate swap market in the main currencies and the size of the most 
successful government bond-based futures contracts. It is easily seen that in both cases the 
euro derivatives are ranked in top position. 
 
Table 7a: Notional amount of interest rate swap outstanding (USDbn) 
Jun-98 Dec-99 Jun-99 Dec-99 Jun-00 Dec-00
Euro 13,576 16,461 17,483 20,692 22,948 21,311
USD 13,214 13,763 16,073 16,510 17,606 19,421
JPY 7,164 9,763 10,207 12,391 12,763 13,107
Others 8,414 10,028 10,309 10,498 10,808 10,829
Total 42,368 50,015 54,072 60,091 64,125 64,668  
Source: BIS Quarterly Review of international and banking markets, various issues. 
 
Table 7b: Turnover and outstanding contracts in government bond based futures contracts 
Contract Exchange Open interest  Total volume  Open interest  Total volume 
Euro-Bund Eurex 618,804 151,326,295 842,146 26,291,123
Euro-Bobl Eurex 385,084 62,502,582 136,688 2,436,491
Euro-Schatz Eurex 383,998 42,822,290 149,077 1,954,183
US 30yr Treasury CBOT 405,409 62,750,843 447,690 17,267,458
US 10yr Treasury CBOT 527,613 46,700,538 605,817 10,629,021
US 5yr Treasury CBOT 358,012 23,331,981 185,008 3,733,542




We have considered the changes in the bond side of the capital market. While the impact of 
the euro is clearly visible there, the equity market has also undergone massive 
transformations. Tsatsaronis (2001) shows that domestic factors have become much less 
important in driving stock market performance, which is becoming more dependent on 
sectoral factors. It is, thus, not surprising that cross-border sectoral mutual funds have been 
one of the most rapidly growing segments of the market since the launch of the euro.   16
5. Conclusions 
 
We have reviewed the development of euro capital market since the introduction of the euro. 
It emerged that the new currency has had profound effects on the European financial scene. 
Confronted with increased competition, European borrowers have had to meet the 
requirements of investors that are no longer captive in their national currencies. All 
borrowers have taken steps to improve the attractiveness of their securities and provide 
investors with enhanced liquidity. 
 
The euro bond market has developed strongly and is getting closer to the structure of the US 
dollar market. This evolution should improve the financial allocation of capital throughout 
the European Union, supporting a more efficient economic system, and make the European 
economic more resilient to economic shocks. 
 
In our view EMU was worth the effort and political risk on the basis of the gains from a more 
performing capital market alone. Public discussion has virtually neglected this aspect and has 
focused on the other sources of gain. 
 
Despite the fact that, as argued by Lamfalussy (2001), the European capital market would 
benefit from a European regulatory and supervisory framework, we have endeavoured in this 
paper to show the dramatic improvements achieved so far, even without this desirable 
change. 
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